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Over almost 70 years, the social-political system ex-
isting in the Soviet Union has been unable to achieve 
economic superiority over the capitalist countries either 
in the development of economics, science and 
technology, or in the well-being of its people; to 
guarantee the inviolability of its state borders and the 
safety of the Soviet people, or to secure the international 
authority appropriate to a great power. — Manifesto of 
the Movement for Socialist Renewal1 
In July 1986 the British newspaper Guardian published a document 
claimed to be a manifesto by a group calling itself the "Movement for 
Socialist Renewal." A copy of this manifesto was passed to the Guardian's 
Moscow correspondent and thereby reached the West.2 It has two sections. 
The first constitutes a severe criticism of the Soviet economy and the poor, 
even desperate, prospects for the future: 
. . . our country has reached a limit beyond which lies an 
insurmountable lag in economic and scientific-technical 
development behind the advanced industrial nations; a 
reverse of the present US-Soviet military parity in favour 
of the USA, and an intensification of the military threat 
to our country . . . 
The second section puts forth the authors' solutions for the reversal of 
these developments. The tone of the manifesto is brisk, straightforward 
and naive. The authors state that they are "a group of Soviet citizens with 
access to objective information" and offer to reveal themselves in public 
debate. 
What possibilities suggest themselves as to the authorship of this 
document? One is that it is a fake produced by some group inside the 
USSR which wishes to discredit Gorbachev by showing that talk of reform 
can lead to anti-Soviet thoughts. However, this seems an unlikely possibili-
ty for three reasons. Gorbachev has excellent relations with the KGB which 
is the organization most capable of manufacturing frauds and passing 
them to Western reporters. Second, the manifesto is written in a spirit of 
loyalty to Leninism and uses the assumptions of Marxism-Leninism. A 
fake would likely be more direct. Third, the manifesto is not a criticism of 
Gorbachev but of his predecessors. The document may have been 
manufactured by external emigres and designed to stir up the pot in the 
USSR. This possibility cannot be ruled out; only further events can tell. It 
is worth observing, however, that on the evidence of the Guardian cor-
respondent, the manifesto is already in the USSR. Thus, even if it is an ex-
ternal emigre document, its circulation in the USSR may create a real 
"movement for socialist renewal." A third possibility is that the document 
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is what it purports to be—the product of people inside the system who 
have come to believe that the USSR is heading for disaster and who wish 
to avert it. In this case, there is no reason to believe that the authors of 
the report are especially high up in the Soviet establishment as the 
manifesto contains no information which is not well-known in the West. 
It was reported that Gorbachev, when he was the Central Commit-
tee Secretary responsible for agriculture, had a team of researchers look 
into the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921.3 Given that the one thing 
which the authors of the manifesto do seem to know something about is 
the NEP, given that a new NEP represents the economic half of their 
proposals, it is possible that some of the authors of the manifesto have 
heard of or took part in this particular exercise. The NEP period is not 
especially well-known in the USSR. To a group of Soviet researchers its 
success, let alone what Lenin stated when he introduced it, may have 
seemed the answer to the USSR's economic problems. Unfortunately, 
the authors of the manifesto do not seem to know very much about the 
other half of the NEP—the time that the USSR enjoyed the greatest 
amount of economic freedom was also the time that the state constructed 
its political control apparatus. Therefore, although the possibility of a 
provocative fake cannot be ruled out, it seems a reasonable hypothesis 
that the manifesto is the product of some junior and middle-level Soviet 
civil servants who got excited about Gorbachev's talk of reform and have 
now become disappointed with what he is actually doing. In this connec-
tion it may not be a coincidence that the document is dated 21 November 
1985. The next day the government announced the formation of 
GosAgroProm." GosAgroProm is a super-ministry for agriculture; as a 
new form of centralization, it is the antithesis of the NEP's program for 
agriculture. It is therefore possible that the announcement of this solu-
tion to the agricultural problem dashed the hopes of the authors that the 
kind of reform that they felt necessary was going to come from the top. 
In simple terms, the manifesto of the Movement for Socialist 
Renewal is a counter Communist Party Program.5 Countering official 
boasting is the grim assertion that socialism has failed, and failed accor-
ding to its own standards. One of the most interesting parts of the 
manifesto are the quotations from Lenin about what the young Soviet 
state must do to survive and the failure, seventy years later, of the system 
to have undertaken these steps. Lenin stated that Soviet Russia must 
catch up with and overtake the advanced countries or perish; Lenin 
boasted that socialism would produce a new labor productivity. Lenin 
stated that Soviet trade must not depend on "colonial" trade goods. In 
failing to accomplish these goals, the regime has failed. The authors go 
on to enumerate the social and spiritual decay of citizens' lives, the lies 
that they are forced to live, the loss of the USSR's position as the leader 
of the socialist part of the world, the failing military position, and the 
failed foreign policy. These failures are inevitable unless the economic 
system is revivified. "Politics are the concentrated essence of 
economics" and economics has failed. All this is put in bald terms and is 
somewhat exaggerated; the actual 1985 position was not as bad as that. 
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Nevertheless, the authors are correct in assuming that a continuation of 
the "brezhnenko" style would be disastrous for the USSR. These 
statements are a blunter version of many of the things which Gorbachev 
is saying publicly. Most of the remarks contained in the manifesto could 
be supported by quotations from his speeches and the other frank admis-
sions which are part of "glasnost," making these criticisms all the more 
telling as they are largely drawn from public knowledge. 
The Movement for Socialist Renewal also offers solutions to the 
problems facing the USSR. Briefly, the manifesto calls for: the licensing 
of factions within the CPSU; genuine freedom of expression within the 
population at large; and a return to the New Economic Policy. In these 
solutions, however, the authors begin to betray an imperfect knowledge 
of Soviet history. The Tenth Party Congress in 1921 was the congress 
which approved the NEP. It was also the congress which approved a 
resolution prohibiting the formation of factions within the Party and the 
congress which sent many of its delegates out to suppress the Kronshtadt 
revolt. The NEP did not come out in a vacuum. 
The tone of the manifesto is that of faithful Leninism—or perhaps 
"fundamentalist late Leninism." The Lenin the authors are quoting is 
the Lenin who defended the NEP, not the Lenin who invented 
"democratic centralism," press censorship, or the political police. They 
seem to believe that things were going well in the USSR until 1924 when 
Lenin died and Stalin began to take over. This is naive in the extreme as 
all the necessary mechanisms by which Stalin seized control were in ex-
istence in Lenin's time. However, such a belief may have its attractions 
for those who are trying to make a new coat from the rags of Marxism-
Leninism. 
The word "faction" rather than "political party" is used because 
the authors of the manifesto are not calling for different parties. Instead, 
they want "the creation in the USSR of different political organizations, 
all with the ultimate aim of building a socialist society," that is, factions 
within the CPSU which differ on tactics and debate openly. But, again, 
the Bolsheviks had factions in the 1920s and found them too dangerous. 
In any case, free and open factions are hardly commensurate with the 
essence of Leninism as expressed in "What Is To Be Done?" 
It is difficult to determine exactly how their political program would 
operate. It seems to be based on their statement, "Now that the full and 
final victory of socialism is complete, the dictatorship of the proletariat 
has fulfilled its historic mission . . . ," and the authors actually seem to 
believe that the citizens of the USSR are all agreed that socialism is the 
aim. Certainly the authors are not very good Marxists—the small traders 
and independent farmers for which they are calling would not, in Marxist 
terms, be supportive of socialism. So, while clearly attempting to pass 
themselves off as good Marxists, the authors do not seem to be as well-
versed in the subject as they might be. 
So what is one to make of the manifesto of the Movement for 
Socialist Renewal? Again assuming that it is not a fake but was produced 
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by low- and middle-ranking people in the USSR, it is a very interesting 
document. Reform in the USSR is a difficult and dangerous undertak-
ing. In 1956 Khrushchev criticized some, though not all, of Stalin's ac-
tions. Partly as a result, there were problems in the satellite countries and 
there were dissidents. If it is lawful to criticize Stalin's persecution of cer-
tain Party members, why cannot one mention his persecution of millions 
of other people or his prosecution of the war or even the bungles and 
crimes of the present generation of Societ leaders? It took a good deal of 
effort to crush the dissident movement. Now, thirty years later, the 
USSR has another General Secretary who is talking about reform.6 By 
the summer of 1987 it was clear that, after two years of trying to form 
public opinion by convincing the people that the USSR was in a perilous 
state, Gorbachev was now taking action. "Glasnost"—more properly 
translated as "publicity" rather than "openness"—was necessary for 
"perestroika"—reconstruction—because Gorbachev has genuinely to 
convince the population that the old ways could not continue. But, 
"glasnost" has also raised a lot of hopes that, finally, some profound 
reforms are going to be implemented. The manifesto of the Movement 
for Socialist Renewal may be the first sign that Gorbachev has not gone 
as far as some wish. Possibly a new dissident movement has been born. 
If this manifesto should be the first signs of a new dissident move-
ment, a movement which embeds its demands in such criticisms will pose 
a serious moral (and morale) challenge to the Soviet government. The 
dissident movement which arose after the Khrushchev revelations about 
Stalin was concerned largely with the issue of the Stalin past. However, 
Stalin is long dead, his henchmen are out of power and, for Soviet 
citizens who had no direct experience of them, the Stalin years must seem 
old hat. The Movement for Socialist Renewal, if it indeed exists, has an 
altogether more challenging message: socialism, according to its own 
standards, has failed. Thinking along these lines can indeed have serious 
results. 
A year after the publication of this document, nothing more has 
been heard of the "Movement for Socialist Renewal," though there have 
been other signs of dissatisfaction, including disturbances which have na-
tional overtones: the riots in Alma-Ata in December 1986; the refusenik 
demonstration in Moscow in February 1987;7 the Crimean Tatar protest 
in Moscow in July 1987;8 and coordinated protests in the Baltic capitals 
in August 1987.' That is a lot of demonstrations by Soviet standards. 
Meanwhile, "glasnost" continues its revelations. In the last year the 
Soviet public has learned that prostitution was not eliminated by the 
Revolution seventy years ago; officials have admitted to a substantial 
drug addiction problem; youth gangs have turned out not to be a product 
of the decadent West after all; alcohol is evidently an immense and in-
tractable failing; gargantuan Party corruption has been uncovered in the 
Kazakh republic; it appears that infant mortality rates are higher than 
they should be. Indeed, it must be becoming uncomfortably clear that 
socialism may not have been such a success after all. 
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Gorbachev continues his reforms and they are reforms which, while 
not exactly those called for in the manifesto, are not altogether unlike 
them. It is clear that Gorbachev is serious about making the Soviet 
system work more efficiently. However, as all Marxists know, thesis 
engenders antithesis. Everyone is aware that the reforms meet opposition 
from the old "Brezhnevites" and it is also clear that many bureaucrats 
resist Gorbachev's threat to their comfort and leisure. Even the average 
Soviet factory worker has reason to be disgruntled. He hears a number of 
speeches blaming him for the stagnancy, he hears rumors about price 
rises and widespread layoffs,10 and Gorbachev's insistence on quality 
means that his productivity bonuses have been reduced." Thus, many of 
the Soviet work force see Gorbachev as the man who has cut their pay, 
blames them for "the old rut" and may have grimmer news for the 
future. Worse, perhaps, they cannot even get a drink to relieve their anx-
iety because the new anti-alcohol laws treat them like hopeless alcoholics. 
It still cannot be determined what the manifesto was all 
about—indeed, since Gorbachev does have a habit of floating his ideas 
before he commits himself to them, it may even be that the manifesto 
was published with his encouragement. Certainly, his reforms, especially 
"self-financing," do resemble elements of the New Economic Policy and 
the program of the manifesto, but it is still early times. It can now be said 
that Gorbachev is serious about reforming the system, though not that he 
wants to really change the Marxist-Leninist system itself. There is con-
siderable opposition to him, yet most of it is passive and resentful and, so 
far, not very powerful. Perhaps most important, it can be said that the 
USSR really is in serious economic and structural difficulties. Whether 
this leads to revolt, as reform has done before in Russia, remains to be 
seen. 
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11. On 1 January 1987 a new institution - GOSPRIEMKA (the State Acceptance Program) 
- came into effect in 1500 industries. State appointed quality control inspectors were in-
troduced into these factories. They replaced factory-appointed inspectors who, 
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tages of the output as below par. On the other hand, Pravda (16 June 1987) published 
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